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Crime, community penalty and integration with
legal formalism in the South Pacific
Mark Findlay
Introduction
The influence of introduced legality on prevailing culture, and vice versa,
are common concerns for analysis when considering the existence and
development of customary law.1  Much of the limited writing on law and
custom prefers to speculate on the impact of introduced law on already
present modes of regulation. While recognising these structuralist contexts
of influence, often oversimplified as they are represented, this paper prefers
to explore the adaptation of legal formalism in contexts of resilient and
resonant custom.2
Further, the paper examines instances where despite the fact that
custom has modified institutional legality, the latter claims predominance
over culture or even denies its existence and legitimacy in certain situations
of sanction. The imposition of penalty is a prime context within which this
transaction of influence takes place.
Less obvious is the paper’s interest in the place of penalty as bridge
between profoundly different contexts of sanction. Irrespective of the
‘systems’ or motivations that support penalty, its sensitivity to culture is
emphasised by the susceptibility of penalty to adaptation, within otherwise
rigid ideologies and institutions. Of additional interest is the manner in which
customary penalties, while appearing equally well to adapt to and represent
quite different sanction ideologies, in fact endanger these ideologies when
called to operate beyond their original cultural context.
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Intersection of custom and legality
Contemporary legislative development in South Pacific jurisdictions evidences
significant difficulty in distinguishing ‘customary law’ from the perspective
of what introduced law (and its jurisprudential framework) recognises and
allows. For example, the ‘individualised rights and responsibilities’ focus of
both common and civil law traditions does not translate well into the
communal social organisation that features in many Pacific cultures.
Western Samoa presents just this issue:
. . . at the root of the conflicts and contradictions between the
Samoan system of customary and traditional laws, and the
‘imported’ systems, is this fundamental difference in
jurisprudential philosophy. Attempts to introduce into the
Samoan system any concept of individual rights separate
from those of the clan was, and still is, resisted as being a
direct threat to the stability of society’.3
The uneasy presence of particular constitutional rights in the Pacific, such
as the right to freedom of movement,4 not only demonstrates a divergence
in notions of humanity that require protection, but also questions institutional
legality where written constitutions are declared to predominate over
customary politics.
The difficulties associated with identifying custom and ‘customary
law’ from the context of introduced law have been exacerbated by the
inextricable link in recent Pacific history between legal formalism and
colonisation. Introduced law and legal institutions have been in the vanguard
of political and commercial policies designed to annex and overrule
indigenous cultures. Once established, introduced laws and institutions
have:
a) gradually recognised the expansion and wider application of customary
laws;5 or
b) re-asserted the importance of customary law, by saying that customary
law is to be applied by all courts but only to certain specified matters or
within certain specified limits;6 or
c) re-asserted the importance of customary law where the courts are to
apply customary law within certain general limits, without these limits being
specified.7
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All of these approaches towards the ‘rehabilitation’ of custom fail to
move beyond the structural context of the introduced legal system and its
formal legality. The best evidence for this is the recognition of ‘custom’
couched within the statutory definitions of the new legality, and in particular
the applicability of custom as dependent on consistency with constitutions,
legislation, and introduced notions of public interest, justice and ‘principles
of humanity’.8
The conceptualisation of ‘customary law’ brings with it some additional
claims to the pre-eminence of legal formalism over custom. By the
reference to ‘customary law’, custom is circumscribed within the
frameworks and expectations for foreign notions of law. Thereby custom
becomes distorted into an alien context even through the use of the word
‘law’. But advocates of custom also employ ‘law’, not wishing to see
custom diminished below the authority generated by ‘law’ terminology in
a competing setting.
In addition, custom as a legitimate instrument of social regulation seems
to be distinguished only from the time of the introduction of foreign legal
forms and institutions. The ‘colonising’ impact of introduced legal formalism
is clear from:
• the attempt to distinguish between ‘law’ and ‘custom’;
• the identification of ‘customary law’;
• the designation of what is ‘fused’ or integrated within, or rejected or
denied by legal formalism.
Such a forced intersection between custom and legality is exposed at
the following levels of socialisation, from the perspective of both indigenous
and introduced cultures:
• ideological where the ‘rule of law’ conflicts with social order;
• functional where formal stigmatisation as a consequence of rule violation
conflicts with reintegration and restitution at a community level; and
• structural where state monopolised prosecution conflicts with customary
obligation collectively identified and administered.9
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The dynamics of custom in its many Pacific variations makes it
distinctly incompatible with rigid legal formalism. Custom exists beyond
singular identification, written description and unaccountable
institutionalisation. Its potential impact is insidious when compared with the
expectations of legal formalism. This might go to explain its recent and
developing influence in contexts where the sanction processes of introduced
law appear ineffectual or out of touch within the context of custom.
Paradoxes of custom and introduced legal formalism in the
context of sanction within postcolonial Pacific States
An initial ‘grab’ for power by colonial administrations in the Pacific was
through control of sanctioning processes. This was effected at several
levels of colonial influence. For example, Christian missionaries, by
introducing a Judeo-Christian moral ethic to dominate indigenous ‘moralities’,
created a compatible climate for the construction and enforcement of
individualised justice largely monopolised as it would be by state judicial
mechanisms.
This is not to suggest that traditional contexts of sanction were entirely
ignored or superseded. Bearing in mind that in many Pacific island
countries, where either weak or transitional state structures struggled for
varying degrees of ascendancy, it was not likely that resilient customary
models would quickly disappear. It appears to be a feature of the colonial
period in the South Pacific that while constitutional legality and parliamentary
government were promoted as the preferred and paramount framework of
governance, the actual impact of introduced law over the socialisation of
custom was, and is, problematic.10
Even so, and perhaps because of the indifferent consequences of
western colonisation, the paradoxes between custom and introduced legal
formalism remain apparent. For example, the ideology of common law
criminal justice relies on features such as individual liability, rational choice
justifying penalty, the state’s obligation to prosecute and punish on behalf
of the community, the limited availability of justification or excuse, and the
consideration of extenuation only in mitigation. It is not a form of justice that
well manages collective behaviour or communal interests. The potential for
paradox where such a notion of justice comes up against customary penalty
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with very keen communal and collective investments is clear. For instance,
with traditional community shaming the whole village is co-opted into the
process and the offender’s family may take collective responsibility not only
for the harm but also for his rehabilitation. Common law liability, on the
other hand, tends to isolate the offender from the community at all stages
of the penalty process, while requiring the individual to restore the social
balance through his guilt and shame.
Paradox over liability
In the Solomon Island case of Loumia v DPP,11 the conflict between
customary obligation and individual responsibility was further complicated
by the need to recognise constitutional rights.
While it was expected that introduced notions of criminal liability
should, following colonisation, apply to both the native and European
populations of the Solomons, ‘it was doubtless considered that such
standards, beliefs, customs and so forth (of the native population), could
and would be taken into consideration by the judge upon the question of
proper punishment in each case’.12 Under this ideological position, therefore,
custom never absolved an offender from criminal liability.13
In Loumia’s case there had been trouble between two groups of Kwaio
and Agai clansmen over a land dispute that the Kwaio had won in the courts.
Following the hearing of the Customary Land Appeal Court two of the Agai
had been sent to prison as a consequence of a knife attack on Loumia’s
brother. Later, during a battle between the two groups involved in the
ongoing land dispute, Loumia’s brother was killed, and his half brother
received severe facial injuries. This occurred in the presence of Loumia and
the other accused, on the village football pitch. Further along a nearby beach
the corpses of three Agais were later found. All the thirteen (13) Kwaio
involved in the fight were charged with the murder of the three Agais.
Loumia, who never denied killing the three, was the only one of the accused
convicted of murder. On appeal he sought to have the conviction reduced
to manslaughter on the grounds that: a) seeing his brother killed and his other
brother maimed so provoked him that the reasonable Kwaio pagan villager
would have acted as he did in the heat of the moment, and b) that in acting
as he did he could avail himself of the extenuation provisions in the Solomon
Island Penal Code, in that although he intentionally and unlawfully caused
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the death of another, he ‘acted in good faith and on reasonable grounds,
where he was under a legal duty to cause the death or do the act which he
did’.
Loumia further argued that the words ‘legal duty’ include a legal duty
in custom, and evidence was adduced by a local chief that if a close relative
is killed Kwaio custom dictates the killing in turn of the person responsible,
even if the person under the duty exposes himself to death.
The trial judge’s rejection of provocation and the impact of customary
duty, due to the inconsistency with the constitutional protection of human
life,14 was upheld by the appeal court. ‘The learned judges approached the
question of the inconsistency of the alleged customary “legal” duty with the
Constitution, and the Penal Code on a policy footing rather than looking at
what the Constitution was seeking to achieve’.15 The fact that the court saw
the customary duty for ‘payback’ as a defence, rather than either an issue
of extenuation or a modification of how liability should be conceptualised,
made it easier for them to reject. In addition, by denying the status of
customary duty here as a legal duty, the court prevented its consideration
within the formal structures of the law as an issue of extenuation. If it was
not ‘legal’ then it could not claim the invitation offered in the schedule to the
Penal Code to inclusion within the law. Further, by denying its status as
‘law’, the court refused to recognise the legal significance of customary
duty that underpins the custom/law connection.
Paradox over justification and excuse
The significance of customary obligation as a justification or excuse for
what would otherwise be criminal was further considered in the Fiji case
of Sosiveta and Others v R.16 Here twenty-nine appellants appealed against
sentences ranging from 18 to 30 months for arson, following their burning
of the house of a fellow villager. The Supreme Court of Fiji heard evidence
that the appellants—all men of good character—acted following the orders
of another villager who was not only a customary leader (Ratu) but was also
regarded as being ‘possessed of a special divine authority’. As a result it was
claimed that the appellants ‘would have been willing to do, quite literally
anything he commands them to do’.
It was not argued that the appellants’ acts were lawful or perhaps even
justified in the circumstances. However, the Supreme Court was invited to
review the original prison sentences bearing in mind the excuse that the
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appellants, particularly the younger ones, felt obliged to carry out the orders
of the Ratu. In law the justification or excuse of customary obligation, if it
could be treated in the same manner as the defences of duress, coercion or
superior orders, should provide an answer to the charges. However, the
court here merely recognised the obligation in the context of mitigation and
reduced the sentences to fines and bonds.
Paradox with extenuation and mitigation
The courts in the Pacific jurisdictions have, in recent years, demonstrated
a recognition of customary sanction when imposing penalties provided for
under criminal codes. While the customary sanctioning process and the
penalties that result may not be endorsed by statute, or exercised by the
courts, the latter have deemed them to be worthy of notice as part of setting
formal legal penalties. This becomes all the more interesting when the forms
some such customary penalties assume may themselves represent the
elements of a criminal offence as defined by state laws.
In the Fiji case of R v Waisea Naburogo and others,17 the respondents
were convicted on their own pleas of shopbreaking, entering and larceny.
Having broken into a co-operative store the accused stole 2 tins of corned
beef, 21 tubs of ice cream, and $20 in cash, to the total value of $25. On
review the court accepted that these were first offenders, that the sum of
$25 had been repaid to the co-operative store by the third respondent’s
father, and that the respondents had each received six strokes of corporal
punishment from the village elders for the same incident. The original court
sentences of imprisonment and care orders were subsequently reduced to
bonds. This was justified by the argument that if the initial magistrate had
been apprised of the facts on restitution and customary penalty then less
harsh sentences would have been handed down.
Another review of sentence in consideration of customary sanction
occurred in R v Vodu Vuli.18 Here the respondent, a school teacher, was
initially sentenced to several significant terms of imprisonment over
convictions for acts of gross indecency with four school boys. The facts
involved the respondent forcing the young boys through fear to indulge with
him in gross acts of indecency. The trial court described the crimes as
‘revolting and repugnant, and constituted a grave breach of trust by the
respondent in regard to the welfare of the boys concerned’. Such offences,
it was said, were serious and called for deterrent sentences.
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On review the court felt that the quantum of sentence should be
determined ‘in the light of whatever mitigating features that may be
present’. Among other more traditional matters in mitigation such as the age
and previous good conduct of the accused, the trial court had apparently not
been aware that ‘the respondent had apologised to the boys’ parents and
made his peace with them in the traditional Fijian way by presenting a
whale’s tooth to them, and as far as the respondent knew the matter ended
there’. The Chief justice halved the original sentences and made them run
concurrently.
These cases take on another level of interest when one considers the
sentencing principles that motivate the state courts in their use of penalty,
when contrasted with the motivation behind custom resolutions. In Vuli in
particular, the eventual sentences could only be explained in conventional
terms as having removed the retributive component of the lower court
sentences.
Reconstructing penalty within foreign contexts of sanction
There is more in the influence of customary penalty over the sanctioning
process of formalised legality than recognition through mitigation, or
acceptance through judicial notice. Throughout the Pacific the penalties
that now emerge from the state-centred judicial system often incorporate
features of customary penalty. Considering the penalty of banishment, and
the process of reconciliation and restitution, I will speculate on the
development of ‘hybrid’ and culturally sensitive penalties in terms of their
ownership, object and purpose. In so doing, Garland’s19 emphasis on the
cultural essence of penalty is confirmed.
Banishment
The history of banishment as penalty in Western Samoa was interestingly
reviewed in the recent decision of Italia Taamale and Taamale Toelau v
Attorney General of Western Samoa.20 This was an appeal from a decision
of the Land and Titles Court, a court in the state judicial hierarchy, ordering
the appellants and their children to leave their village by a nominated date.
The appellants argued on appeal that they could not be in contempt of the
original court order through non-compliance because the penalty itself
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contravened Article 13 1) d) and 4) of the Constitution. In addition it was
clear from earlier decisions of the Supreme Court that the penalty of
banishment was not to be recognised by the courts of Western Samoa. The
tenor of this argument was that ‘ownership’ of the penalty remained within
customary tribunals, directed against traditional relationships and for the
purpose of enforcing customary obligations. None of these therefore
should be legitimated at the level of the state through its legal formalism. The
appeal court has now come to a position against such submissions.
Banishment was historically rooted, as the court saw it:
there is no doubt that banishment from the village has long
been an established custom in Western Samoa.
In 1822 the German Administration of Western Samoa passed an Ordinance
to Control Certain Samoan Customs. The Ordinance prevented Samoans of
any station from ‘expelling any person from his village or district, under
penalty of imprisonment . . .’ The penalty of banishment was then reserved
to the Administrator.
With the introduction of constitutional legality, the status of banishment
as a penalty became ambiguous in terms of ownership and objective. The
appeal court drew from earlier decisions of the Supreme Court the view that:
undoubtedly the customs and usages of Samoa in the past
acknowledged the rights of village councils and the court to
make banishment orders, but that custom ceased on 28
October 1960 when the Constitution was adopted.
Several judgments of the Supreme Court in the 1970s and 1980s endorsed
appeal points that such banishment orders were in violation of the
constitutional rights of freedom of movement and residence.
In Taamale the appeal court acknowledged that today for many village
councils in Western Samoa, banishment was the ‘most important sanction
vested by custom in the village council’. It was usually employed when
other forms of customary penalty such as fines and ostracism from village
affairs had failed. But a further argument in favour of the continued
significance of banishment was that as an effective threat at a village level
it did not usually necessitate the employment of state-centred crime control
resources such as the police to back up the enforcement of customary
orders.
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The Land and Titles Court is the only judicial ‘site’ from where
banishment as a penalty may emerge:
While upholding the jurisdiction of the Land and Titles
Court to order banishment we do so on the express basis that
the jurisdiction can only lawfully be exercised in accordance
with the principles and safeguards identified in the present
judgement.
The purpose of the penalty is limited to ‘the interests of public order—
meaning to prevent disturbances, violence or the commission of offences
against the law’. Now the Land and Titles Court has taken the responsibility
for the banishment penalty (as a formal court order) from the village
council, to which it leaves only the ultimate penalty of ostracising a person
within the village. The Court’s assumption of this penalty and this sanction
as within its jurisdiction was endorsed by the appeal court.
A justification as to why banishment moved from the ‘ownership’ of
the village council, to that of a Court is:
that the imposition of a banishment order is made fair and
reasonable and according to law . . . An individual who is
dissatisfied with a decision given at the first instance level
of the Land and Titles Court also has further (formal) avenues
for seeking redress . . . as the Land and Titles Court can make
a banishment order, so that court can cancel it.
The process of ‘ownership’ is ‘that a village council minded towards
banishment from the village would be well advised to petition that [the Land
and Titles] Court for an order rather than take an extreme course on their
own responsibility’. Further, because serious offences21 such as murder
and rape are grounds for banishment ‘it is necessary to say that the
punishment of (such) offences is a matter for the criminal courts. Serious
crime is properly dealt with in the Supreme Court’. This appears to be both
a further constraint on the object and purpose of banishment and a limitation
over its ownership.
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The court concluded:
Banishment from a village is, at the present time, a reasonable
restriction imposed by existing law, in the interests of public
order, on the exercise of the rights of freedom of movement
and residence affirmed (in the Constitution).
Interestingly, the court recognised the dynamic and culture-bound nature
of this penalty; ‘as Western Samoan society continues to develop the time
may come when banishment will no longer be justifiable’.
Reconciliation
Section 163 of the Criminal Procedure Code (1978) of Fiji provides that
where charges for criminal trespass, common assault, assault occasioning
actual bodily harm, or malicious damage to property are brought under the
Penal Code:
. . . the court may in such cases which are substantially of a
person(al) or private nature and which are not aggravated in
degree, promote reconciliation and encourage and facilitate
the settlement in an amicable way, on terms of payment of
compensation or on other terms approved by the court, and
may thereupon order the proceedings to be stayed or
terminated.
While having regard to the court’s role as a ‘facilitator’ in the reconciliation
processes, this section operates on the understanding that this sanction is
in the hands of the accused. To that extent the court dispossesses itself of
‘ownership’ of the penalty beyond its role in promoting settlements of this
form.
The state constrains the use of such penalty, or at least limits the
situations in which reconciliation may be recognised by the court, by
designating the offences to which it may relate. This is important in terms
of a purpose for reconciliation; that being the staying or termination of other
penalty options.
Reconciliation has long existed as a feature of the restitution and
compensation dimension of customary punishments in the Pacific. Even so
its punitive potential is recognised in section 163 through the reference to
‘payment of compensation or any other terms approved by the court’.
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Further, by providing for an avoidance of any further state-based penalty
by achieving reconciliation, the institutions of legal formalism have
incorporated this penalty within their own sentencing options.
The operation of reconciliation under the sponsorship of the state
courts differs from the ‘self help’ penalties identified in the case of R v
Lati.22 Here the defendants, five young Fijian villagers, assaulted a young
man from another village. The people from the defendants’ village responded
by administering corporal punishment to the defendants and offering a
ceremonial apology to the Chief of the victim’s village. The defendants were
then brought to trial and received prison sentences. On appeal these
sentences were overturned as being too severe. The appeal court recognised
the penalties meted out by the village, and the exchange of apologies:
It must be acknowledged that the Makadru (defendants)
villagers had taken great pains, in the absence of any police
presence in the island, to settle the problem in the only way
known to them which is by their own established customs
and traditions. Though these have no legal force as such
they are nevertheless entitled, in a suitable case, to recognition
by the courts in such a manner so as to uphold their sanctity
and moral force within the Fijian society . . . All the
respondents had been dealt with appropriately in the Fijian
customary way and whatever potential strife might have
resulted between the two villages because of the incident
had also been taken care of appropriately in the Fijian
customary way. One could not wish for a more civilised way
of sorting out a potentially explosive situation.23
Lati was another case where the appeal courts recognised customary
penalty and gave ex post facto legitimacy to such penalty. The reconciliation
‘law’ differs from the customary context of reconciliation in that although
there may be a similar emphasis on methods such as the formal apology to
restore peace and good order, the reconciliation process is either activated
or overseen as a feature of legal formalism. The purpose of reconciliation
remains the same whether it emerges from custom or the state courts, and
the objects of the restored relationship are consistent in both penalty forms.
It is the nature of the state sponsorship, rather than shared ‘ownership’ of
the penalty that marks out state-sponsored reconciliation from the customary
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practice. Even where the state ideologises reconciliation through civil
restitution, the state is the sponsor and arbiter of the process.
The modern consequences of reconciliation as a penalty option within
the formal courts are interesting. In its customary context reconciliation is
governed by three factors:
• the public nature of its settlement;
• the collective nature of its terms; and
• the relative expectations of the parties involved.
In its contemporary context within legal formalism it would appear that
reconciliation has been removed from an open, accountable and relative
penalty24 within which the community has an investment, into a far more
private and localised settlement. In Fiji today it is common, when domestic
violence comes before the court, to see reconciliation promoted as an
appropriate penalty. However, because of the unequal power positions of
persons negotiating domestic reconciliations, the private nature of their
terms, and the application of expectations that may go well beyond the
immediate issue of the assault or future threats of violence, reconciliation
may become more of an avoidance of penalty, rather than a penalty. For
instance, where a complainant withdraws her allegation of assault as a result
of a reconciliation, this may be the consequence of threats from the husband
to throw the wife out into the street if she does not ‘reconcile’, rather than
any genuine rapprochement. The court would not become aware of this by
simply seeking an assurance of reconciliation from the accused, and the
complainant may not be examined by the court in this regard. The
community, the traditional witness and enforcer of reconciliation, also has
no voice in the court hearing.
Adaptations of penalty against conflicts in the context of
sanction
The interaction between custom and introduced legal formalism at the level
of sanctions is more than a contest over ownership of penalties. The manner
in which certain forms of penalty have been incorporated into introduced
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legal formalism indicates the resilience of penalties that remain close and
viable within their original cultural context. However, it is simplistic to
expect, despite similar aspirations for penalty in both custom and introduced
law, that by sharing or reproducing penalty the results (sanctions) will be,
or even should be the same. As reconciliation demonstrates, the partial
removal of penalty from its cultural and customary context may transform
its impact as well as undermining its viability in the original form.
A key to the problem of ‘re-culturising’ penalty is the realisation that the
state is not the community, and therefore legal formalism as a feature of the
state may not be supportive of customary penalty. Those features of
custom penalty that seem appealing when compared with the formalised
penalty structures of introduced law (such as openness and accountability)
are often compromised or corrupted within state-centred environments.
Further, the essential sanction impact of custom penalties may be lost as
they are required to address new aspirations for the sanction process.
Also, the different ideologies of justice prevailing in legal formalism, and
custom, may bring about very different consequences for the object and
purpose of penalty. For instance, on the one hand the object might be the
offender/victim relationship and the purpose may be deterrence or retribution.
On the other the object is the community and the purpose, restitution and
social cohesion.
The obligations created by penalty within the context of custom or legal
formalism also require consideration if the outcome of any reconstructed
penalty is to be assumed.25 These obligations endorse the integration of
penalty within custom, whereas it stands at the end (or even outside) state-
centred sanctions in formalised criminal justice.
The integration of penalty and custom has been misunderstood in
efforts to incorporate customary penalty within introduced legal formalism.
This misunderstanding demonstrates as much about the tendency to isolate
through formalised criminal sanctioning, as it does about the essential re-
integrative spirit of custom penalty in a community context such as that
prevailing in South Pacific tradition.
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